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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
1.

Does ongoing, statewide pre-trial publicity

arising from this Court's decision, resurrected from
Defendant's conditional plea, effectively deny him a fair
trial anywhere in Utah now, essentially limiting his remedy to
standing on the plea and going forward with sentencing?
2.

Given that Defendant only has one realistic course

of action left, to wit:

standing on his plea and going

forward to sentencing, after having confessed in reliance, of
the District Court's promise to spare his life and with no
objection from the State, is the remedy offered by this
Honorable Court, under the circumstances existing now, so
harsh as to deny Defendant due process of law, requiring
additional relief therefore?

ii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff-Respondent,

])

Case No. 20265

v.
]i Priority No. 1

DOUGLAS EDWARD KAY,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a Petition for Rehearing of the March 7, 1986
decision of the above Court wherein this Court, after
upholding the Defendant's position in many particulars, also
upheld Hon. J. Harlan Burn's decision to not enforce the
Conditional Plea agreement whereby Defendant's life would be
spared if he would plead guilty to three counts of capital
murder and four counts of aggravated robbery.
Defendant respectfully requests this Court to
reconsider its decision in light of ongoing new pretrial
publicity throughout the State of Utah, and consider whether
same effectively denies Defendant one of the remedies offered
by this Honorable Court, to wit:

a jury trial, and whether

the only other realistic alternative places Defendant in a
position of no choice at all but rather of being forced to go
1

forward to sentencing on the basis of an illegally obtained
confession,

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant agrees with the fact statement set out in
State v. Kay, 29 Utah Adv. Rep. 30,
purposes of this Petition.

P.2d

, (1986), for

Defendant also incorporates herein

certain representative newspaper articles, attached hereto as
Appendix A and made a part hereof.

Defendant further

respectfully requests this Court to take Judicial Notice of
the statewide and ongoing publicity of this case, as a matter
of fact, pursuant to U.R.Ev. Rule 201(b)(1) and 201(b)(2), and
201(c).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This Court's analysis in State v. Kay, supra, does not
take into account the effects of on-going publicity, including
resurrected, and often inaccurate and inflammatory, media
accounts of Defendant's "horrifying tale" of "execution-style
slaying,"

which publicity effectively denies Defendant

meaningful access to a jury trial and/or a fair trial.
With only one realistic remedy left, this Court should

The Daily Spectrum, Washington County Edition,
Thursday, March 27, 1986 p.3.

2

respectfully reconsider additional appropriate remedies,
including specific performance of the conditional plea,
particularly in light of the Statefs failure to object,
thereby luring

Defendant into not only a "chilling"

confession but also into providing prosecutors with a road-map
of the case.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
In its appellate brief, Defendant stated at p. 41 that
The cure in the instant case is to order the District
Court to grant specific performance to Mr. Kay, not to
compound error on error by depriving him of more of
his fundamental freedoms by giving the State an
unnecessary publicity tainted second bite at the apple
in some other county....
Defendant was no less concerned about adverse
prejudicial publicity on November 28, 1984, when his Appellate
Brief was filed, than he is about inflammatory press coverage
in March, April, or November of 1986, when he is headed to
trial and/or sentencing.
This Court, however, did not address the issue of
adverse publicity denying him a fair trial in its decision,
although in Part IV of its opinion in State v. Kay, supra at
37, it did address "fundamental fairness" as applied to due

3

process and specific performance, but stops there, stating
"[We] have considered Kay's other contentions on appeal and
find them to be without merit."
In light of statewide and inflammatary reporting of
this case, including of this Court's own decision, Defendant
respectfully requests this Court to (1) take Judicial Notice
of such publicity

and consider same, and (2) reconsider its

conclusion that Mr. Kay can go forward to trial without
prejudicial effect.
This Court is also respectfully requested to take
Judicial Notice of State of Utah v. Norman Lee Newstead, now
before this Court, and of the statewide publicity that this
case has generated to the detriment of Mr. Kay's ability to
receive a fair trial, and in light of Mr. Newstead1s blaming
Mr. Kay for the alleged murders in question in avoiding the
Death Penalty himself.
Without rearguing what has already been submitted,
Defendant respectfully refers this Court to Appellant's Brief,
IIC, at 38, for consideration in light of the new and ongoing
publicity, and of the changed circumstances caused by Mr.
Newstead's testimony.

Defendant also argues that it would be

unrealistic to assume that (1) the publicity will decrease,

State v. Kay, supra, at 38.
UTAH RULES OF EVID. Rule 201(b)(1), 201(b)(2), and 201(c).
4
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CONCLUSION
With life or death literally at issue, Defendant
respectfully requests and urges this Court to review its
decision in light of the improbability that Mr. Kay will ever
receive a fair trial anywhere in Utah as a result of statewide
media coverage which resurrects his initial confession, and
which uses such inflammatory words as "horrifying" and
"execution style".

Defendant submits that no matter what

precautionary or protective measures are taken, that this
publicity—arising from a confession where the state waived
timely objection—will follow Mr. Kay through jury selection
and into trial, thereby denying him fundamental trial
protections and rights.
The Defendant certifies that this petition is
presented in good faith, for the reasons set out herein, and
not for purposes of delay.
Dated this r

day o f / y ^ /

, 1986

HUNTSMAN
Attorney ¥or Defendant-Appellant

PHILLIP LANG POREMASTER
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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Earl Dorius
Attorney General's Office
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Scott Jay Thorley
Iron County Attorney
216 South 200 West
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Creighton Horton, II
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
231 East Fourth South, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Supreme Court grants tiling extension in Kay case
by Krlstine Messerly
Staff Writer
CEDAR CITY - The Utah Supreme Court has given attorneys for
confessed
Playhouse
murderer
Douglas Edward Kay an extension
on the deadline to file a motion for a
rehearing in his case, a court clerk
said today.
Kay's attorney, Clayton Huntsman, was granted until April 1 to
ask the court to review its March 7
decision in which it remanded jurisdiction in the case back to 5th District Court for settlement, an extension of one week on the usual time
allowed for such a motion.
Huntsman said Wednesday he
asked for an extra week to review the
lengthy Supreme Court opinion in order to decide whether a motion for a
rehearing was proper.
Should Huntsman choose to file
motions in federal court asking for

relief in the case, he would be required to have exhausted all possible
state remedies — including the filing
of a motion asking the high court to
reconsider its decision.
Motions for rehearings are rarely
granted, but serve the purpose of giving the justices a chance to review
and revise their opinion.
Huntsman said he will ask for a rehearing if he decides there are
grounds for asking for such a review
— If, for example, he decides
changed circumstances justify a rehearing, or if parts of the opinion are
unclear or contradictory, requiring
further explanation by the court.
After more than a year's time for
consideration, the justices, in a 25page opinion handed down March 7,
denied Kay's interlocutory appeal,
which had asked the court to enforce
a unique plea bargain agreement
struck between Judge J. Harlan
Burns and Kay. Kay pleaded guilty
to three counts of capital homicide In
exchange for a promise that the

would be sentenced to life imprisonment rather than death.
After hearing a horrifying tale in
which Kay described the executionstyle slaying of three victims during
a robbery ofthe bar, Burns accepted
the pleas without objection from Iron
County Attorney Scott Thorley.
Two weeks later.Thorley did object, and after hearing argument on
the propriety of the plea arrangement Burns reversed his decision to
accept the plea, ruling that the court
was not bound to by the agreement to
Impose life imprisonment and basing
his ruling in part on the fact that the
prosecution was suprised by the conditional plea. He gave Kay the option
of withdrawing his gulty pleas or proceeding to sentencing with the possibility of being sentenced to death.
Kay instead asked the Supreme
Court to step in to order enforcement
of the plea bargain. His attorneys
also argued that the principles of
double jeopardy precluded the option
of setting the pleas; as
aside and forcing

him to begin the process anew and
that the trial court's actions violated
Kay's rights to due process.
The high court ruled the plea bargain did violate procedural requirements of trial courts, but the violation * did not render the plea
agreement invalid. "... We do not
find that the trial court abused its
discretion in declaring a misplea and
ordering Kay to either face sentencing or to withdraw his plea of guilty,"
the court ruled. "The trial court
found that the conditional plea was illegal."
The high court did rule that a Mseries of errors" took place when Huntsman proposed the plea and when
Burns agreed to entertain the plea
without gaining the express approval
of the plea by Thorley.
The problems were "compounded
by the prosecution," according to the
Supreme Cout opinion.
"A timely objection by the state
would have prompted the judge to
stop the proceedings and would have

obviated the resulting problems,"
according to the opinion.
The justices say in a footnote to the
opinion that "we are deeply troubled
by the prosecutions conduct" in not
framing a timely objection. The
prosecution raised objections "only
after a new lead counsels appearance and after the defendant's
open court confession had thoroughly
inflamed the public." the justices
say.
Despite the series of mistakes by
attorneys for both sides and by Judge
Burns, the high court ruled that nothing happened which violates Kay's
rights to the point where further
prosection of tne case should take
place.
In the majority opinion, the court
ruled that "...the trial judge (Burns)
was entitled to rescind his acceptance of the agreement under the circumstances of this case and neither
double jeopardy nor due process considerations bar the state from pro-

ceeding to trial."
"Kay may either withdraw the
guilty pleas that were given as part
of the aborted plea agreement and
enter new pleas br he may choose to
stand on his guilty pleas and proceed
to sentencing ... with no guarantee as
to the sentence."
Thorley would not comment on
specifics of the high court opinion,
but did say he was pleased at the second chance to prosecute Kav.
"We're pleased to have the opportunity to prosecute Douglas Edward
Kay, which has been our object since
March 1984," Thorley said. "Our desire is to seek a conviction and the
death penalty."
Should the motion for a rehearing
be denied, Kay will decide between
the two options given him by the high
court, Huntsman said. "He (Kay)
has been told about the decision and
knows his options," he said.

